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Theories developed in the so-called “second-generation” cognitive sciences have permitted 
significant advances in our understanding of how human beings find linguistic and other forms of 
symbolic representation to be meaningful.1 In particular, since about 1980, research coming from 
the “embodiment paradigm” in cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics has demonstrated 
just how much people’s ability to make sense of their experience is underwritten by conceptual 
structures and cognitive processes that emerge from interactions among brain, body, and world. 
Rejecting any view of cognition as abstract symbol manipulation, embodiment theorists claim that 
thought – and hence the structure and use of language – is in fact directly grounded in the human 
body’s sensory and motor capacities. To the extent that Classics considers itself a broadly 
hermeneutic discipline that aims to shed light on the meanings elaborated by members of Greek 
and Roman society, it therefore seems crucial for classical scholars not only to have an awareness 
of the findings of this “embodied” cognitive science, but also to incorporate its insights into their 
interpretive strategies. For this reason, in this paper I introduce certain theoretical constructs from 
the cognitive interdiscipline – specifically, image schemas and conceptual metaphor – that I 
                                                 
* I wish to thank this volume’s editors as well as Douglas Cairns and the press’s anonymous referees for providing excellent 
feedback on earlier versions of this paper. The usual disclaimers apply about any remaining omissions or errors. 
1 Differing from traditional “first generation” cognitive science which viewed cognition largely in information-processing terms as 
abstract symbol manipulation – a view that has been dubbed the ‘MIND-AS-COMPUTER’ metaphor – the “second generation” 
cognitive sciences emphasize mental processes as embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended (generally grouped as “4E theory”): 
see esp. Rowlands (2010); Boden (2008); and Gallagher (2005). 
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consider key to any psychologically realistic, humanly plausible account of meaning in ancient 
language and literature (and indeed in ancient culture more generally) and then go on to illustrate 
their analytic potential through a study of Latin’s metaphorical expressions of courage and 
cowardice.2 
 
1. An “experientalist” account of meaning. 
What, more precisely, does a psychologically realistic, humanly plausible account of meaning look 
like? In my view, it is one that adopts an explicitly “experientialist” theory of cognition, committed 
to the idea that, for human beings, our thinking depends fundamentally on the kind of brain we 
possess functioning in the kind of body we have in the kinds of physical, social, and cultural 
environments we typically inhabit (or have historically inhabited).3 In other words, it is one that 
views concepts as embodied mental representations deriving their meaning not through their 
correspondence to objects in external reality, but through their link to human conceptualizing 
capacities and psychological functions, which are grounded in and deeply constrained by our 
                                                 
2 Sansò (2014) 310 states that, “Overall, there has not been much work so far on Ancient Greek within the framework of CL”. This 
judgment may already be somewhat out of date, since one can point to the studies by Douglas Cairns of Greek emotion concepts 
such as aidṓs, phrikḗ, and érōs in the light of conceptual metaphor theory, or to the analyses that Cristóbal Pagán Cánovas and 
Georgis Giannakis have given of the Greek poetic images of the “arrows of love” and of the Fates as “weavers”, respectively, in 
terms of conceptual integration theory. Kiki Nikiforidou and Silvia Luraghi have also explained the meanings of the cases and 
prepositions in Greek in terms of image schemas of spatial relation (and their figurative interpretations), while Rafael Martínez 
Vázquez and José Miguel Jiménez Delgado have shown that metaphors such as ‘EXPERIENCES ARE OBJECTS’ motivate the polysemy 
of many Greek verbs (cf., e.g., phérō in its literal and figurative senses). Meanwhile, Bruce Louden and Drew Griffiths have 
examined the systems of metaphor that underpin certain Homeric formulae. 
By comparison, studies of the Latin language and Latin literature in the perspective of cognitive linguistics remain relatively 
few. Early work by Francisco García Jurado found that the sorts of orientational metaphors cognitive linguists have identified in 
English (‘GOOD IS UP’, ‘BAD IS DOWN’, and so forth) are also present in Plautine Latin. More recently, Luisa Brucale and Egle 
Mocciaro have described how the senses of Latin per develop from a “prototypical nucleus” in the spatial domain to cover abstract 
domains including causation, instrumentality, and purpose. Chiara Fedriani has produced several studies (including a monograph) 
of the metaphors underlying Latin’s eventive and stative expression (e.g., ‘EXPERIENCES ARE OBJECTS’, as evidenced by in dubio 
sum, sto, maneo, iaceo, haereo). My own research has focused on how Latin speakers’ preferential conceptualization of, for 
example, the mind, communication, and mistakenness in terms of certain image-schematic metaphors contribute to a distinctively 
Roman worldview: with organizing effects across different aspects of language, thought, and behavior, metaphorically structured 
“folk models” actually appear to function as part of the “hidden metaphysics” that defines what it means be a member of Roman 
society. Important first steps towards what I call a Roman “cultural semantics”; see my concluding remarks in sect. 4. 
3 See esp. Lakoff and Johnson (1980 and 1999); Johnson (1987); Gibbs (1994); and Grady (1997). 
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bodily nature, as well as by the local and global socio-cultural context.4 It is therefore one that 
takes a middle ground between the representationalism and functionalism of the “classical” 
computational theory of mind in philosophy and “good old-fashioned artificial intelligence” 
(Haugeland 1985, 112) – that is, any notion that human thought consists in the syntactical 
manipulation of implementation-independent abstract symbol systems that mentally “re-present” 
the structures of an objectively existing physical world to the mind – and the “radical embodiment” 
of enaction theorists like Humberto Maturana and Francesco Varela, which proposes a view of 
cognition as the effect of flat brain-body-action-world systems and which in its strongest forms 
sees no need for mental representations whatsoever for implementing intelligent behavior.5 
Such a moderately embodied theory of cognition (cf. Prinz 2008) implies a very different 
account of meaning than that found in traditional (formal) philosophical and linguistic semantics. 
Generally speaking, experientialist approaches reject “truth-conditional” theories of linguistic 
meaning, which posit that an utterance’s meaning corresponds to the set of conditions in the world 
(or in any possible world) for which the utterance can said to be true. Moving beyond the view of 
defining categories by lists of “necessary and sufficient” features, they adopt a theory of 
categorization that recognizes classes characterized by nonobjective human perceptual, 
interactional, or purposive properties.6 In many cases, cognitive linguists claim that word meaning 
may not be reducible at all to symbols expressed in amodal, propositional format and arbitrarily 
linked to their referents. Rather than being represented in the mind as language-like symbols, the 
meanings of words very often are said to actually correspond (directly or indirectly through 
figurative interpretation) to gestalt structures of experience or “image schemas”. In cognitive 
                                                 
4 See Wilson (2002). 
5 Maturana and Varela (1987 and 1980). 
6 Cf. Rosch (1973 and 1978); Barsalou (1983); Fillmore (1985); Lakoff (1987); Johnson (1987); Taylor (1989); Atran (1993); 
Vallée-Tourangeau et al. (1998). 
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psychology, an image schema is a highly abstract structure of cognition that emerges through 
human perceptual and sensorimotor interaction with the world – as Mark Johnson (1987, xiv) 
writes, “a recurring dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives 
coherence and structure to our experience”. Image schemas may therefore be visual in nature, e.g., 
“long, thin shapes, or containers” (Lakoff 1987, 113‒14), or more abstract representations deriving 
from the character of human spatial experience, such as up/down schemas, center/periphery 
schemas and movement schemas. As cognitive structures that are analogues of (because dependent 
on the same neural architecture as) sensorimotor experience and thus open to visual and kinesthetic 
“transformations” in mental space, image schemas provide the inferential patterns that motivate 
the range of senses typically characterizing the meanings of words.7 
Image schemas may also be metaphorically interpreted, extending meaning further into 
abstract domains. According to the theory of conceptual metaphor, it is through the regular 
metaphorical mapping of bodily-based image schematic structure onto concepts not directly 
grounded in experience that human abstract thought is in fact possible. Recognizing the all-
pervasive character of certain metaphorical patterns in language, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson 
argued (1980, 1999) that the clustering of metaphorical linguistic expressions around many 
(mostly abstract) concepts in fact reflects inherently metaphorical understandings that speakers of 
a language possess of those concepts. 8 Speakers of a language talk about abstract domains of 
experience metaphorically, that is, because they actually conceive of them metaphorically in terms 
of other (mostly concrete) experiences. In this embodied view of cognition, literal concepts are 
those formed through bodily interaction with the world, and metaphors are regular projections or 
mappings of conceptual content – concepts or whole structured domains of knowledge – that occur 
                                                 
7 See esp. Gibbs and Colston (1995). 
8 Lakoff and Johnson (1980); Lakoff (1987); Johnson (1987); and Kövecses (2005 and 2006). 
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as a way of mentally representing and reasoning about abstract concepts not directly grounded in 
physical experience. An important claim of this theory is that metaphorical mappings are not 
arbitrary and unconstrained, but experientially motivated, typically by their grounding in 
systematic correlations in phenomenal experience. Image schemas and their metaphorical 
projections therefore provide a solution to the problem of how linguistic expressions and other 
symbols acquire their meanings, since in this view all abstracta are grounded, at some level, in 
structures of cognition that emerge from bodily experiences that are directly meaningful to human 
beings.  
It is in this sense, then, that I take cognition and language to be embodied: namely, that human 
conceptualization, and thus the inferential processes guiding semantic extension, depends in large 
part on cognitive structures – i.e., images schemas – and construal operations that arise 
naturalistically from (indeed are analogues of) recurring perceptual and kinesthetic experiences. 
Through unidirectional mappings of image schematic structure to domains not directly grounded 
in experience, literal (physicospatial) understanding comes to be extended to abstract reasoning. 
Because they emerge from, or are grounded in, repeated human bodily movements through space, 
perceptual interactions, and ways of manipulating objects, image schemas – unlike Fodorian 
representations (amodal abstract symbols) – are thus directly meaningful representational 
structures. At the same time, because they are gestalt patterns of experience which capture the 
structural contours of our bodily interactions with the world (only secondarily imageable “in the 
mind’s eye”), image schemas – unlike enactivist couplings, which do away with mental 
representations altogether – are inherently multimodal structures that operate beneath 
consciousness. Cognitive and linguistic embodiment therefore pertains to the fact that figurative 
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as well as literal understanding is based on at least partial activations of the same sensorimotor 
areas of the brain.9 
Consider, for example, that in many languages what we call anger is conceptualized as heated 
fluid in a container. In English, this conceptualization is captured in idiomatic phrases such as blow 
one’s stack, lip one’s lid, and let off steam, where the notion of emotional intensity is mapped to 
that of the liquid’s temperature, and anger’s effects on the body to the pressurization of the liquid.10 
A version of this metaphor also appears in Latin, as indicated by expressions like Quinctius quidem 
adeo exarsit ira (“Quinctius so ‘blazed forth’ in anger”, Liv. AUC. 35.31.13), mortis fraternae 
feruidus ira (“‘Seething’ with anger at his brother’s death”, Verg. Aen. 9.736), or ardet et iram / 
non capit . . . / . . . exaestuat ira (She (sc. Procne) ‘burns’ and cannot ‘contain’ her anger . . . she 
‘boils over’ with anger”, Ov. Met. 6.610–11, 623). It is the fact that such mappings involve the 
transfer of an organized system of knowledge from concrete physical experience (namely, how 
fluids behave in heated, pressurized conditions) to abstract emotional experience (namely, anger) 
that allows English and Latin speakers to think, and thus talk, coherently about an aspect of human 
life that may be difficult to comprehend in and of itself. Moreover, talking about anger in terms of 
hot fluid is immediately meaningful to speakers of these languages, since the metaphor is grounded 
in the apparently universal human experience of feeling hot and pressurized when angry. 
Experimental studies have shown that the occurrence of anger coincides with objectively 
                                                 
9 For the representation of metaphorical mappings in the brain, see above all Feldman (2006). Some early brain imaging studies 
found no evidence of neuronal co-activation during metaphor processing: see esp. Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006 and Aziz-Zadeh and 
Damasio 2008. More recent studies, however, point to at least partial recruitment of domain-specific sensory cortex during 
figurative language processing: cf., e.g., Desai et al. (2011); Lacey et al. (2012); Desai et al. (2013). 
10 See esp. Kövecses (1986). 
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measurable increases in skin temperature and blood pressure.11 In this way, (part of) the physiology 
of anger itself affords a ready image for conceptualizing such experiences in the abstract.12 
 
2. Latin’s metaphors of courage and cowardice. 
Cognitive linguists take as given that complex, culturally situated concepts may in fact acquire 
their structure and content via whole networks of metaphors. Where a concept is characterized by 
several distinct metaphors, cognitive linguists argue that these metaphors normally work together 
to produce a working understanding of the concept’s various aspects.13 While the metaphors may 
recruit different conceptual materials and so fail to provide a consistent overall image to 
conceptualization, nevertheless they fit together coherently as a system, each metaphor delivering 
an understanding of some dimension of the metaphorically defined concept. In this respect, 
consider Latin speakers’ conceptualization of courage and cowardice in terms of animus, which is 
delivered by the system of metaphors illustrated by Figure 1. <Figure 1: Metaphorical source 
domains contributing to Latin speakers’ conceptualization of courage and cowardice.> What this 
figure shows is the set of images converging on animus as a way of expressing the concepts both 
of courage and of cowardice: that is, the images that metaphorically capture Latin speakers’ 
understanding of courage and cowardice as distinct but inextricably related aspects of experience. 
As the figure shows, this understanding is delivered by highly schematic (rather than richly 
elaborated) images drawn from a limited number of concrete bodily source domains. It also shows 
that each of these domains provides a pair of contrasting image schemas to conceptualization, 
                                                 
11 E.g., Ekman et al. (1983); Levenson et al. (1990); Levenson et al. (1991). 
12 See Kövecses (1995). Of course, an increase of blood pressure and skin temperature also characterizes the physiological response 
associated with other emotions, which is why we find HEAT (and conversely COLD) used metaphorically of a range of such 
experiences (for instance, affection or lust): cf., e.g., Williams and Bargh (2008); Wilkowski et al. (2009); and, in an ancient context, 
Cairns (2013) 86‒87. 
13 On the character and function of such metaphor systems, see Danesi and Perron (1999) and Kövecses (2006). 
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mapping reciprocally correlated physical concepts to those of courage and cowardice (as well as 
their relation). 
Let us see in somewhat greater detail what each of these conceptual mappings entails.14 Take 
the VERTICAL ORIENTATION metaphor. In this metaphor, animus is imagined as a kind of physical 
object or structure and courageousness corresponds to animus being in a state of vertical 
up(right)ness. Thus, Latin speakers employ verbs referring literally to “lifting up” (tollere) or 
“setting up(right)” (erigere) with animum or animos to convey the meaning we might express in 
English as “taking” or “gathering” or “plucking up” one’s courage or, equally, “giving” or 
“instilling” or “inspiring” courage. For example, Livy describes Marcellus rallying his men at Nola 
as literally “‘setting up(right)’ the spirits of his own men” (suorum militum animos erigeret, AUC. 
23.45.5), while Livy’s epitomizer conveys the notion that the Parthians took courage from Crassus’ 
death by saying that they “‘stood up’ their spirits” (animos erexerant, Ann. Flor. Ep. 4.9). Similarly, 
to express that the Trojans became very emboldened, Vergil writes that they literally “‘lift up’ their 
spirits to the stars” (animos ad sidera tollunt, Aen. 9.637) – ad sidera representing, according to 
                                                 
14 Discovering large-scale metaphorical mappings of this sort begins from dictionary and corpus work. Because the linear 
alphabetical ordering of traditional lexicons tends to obscure figurative associations that structure the semantic system at a higher 
order than the individual lexeme, reference works like Meissner’s Latin Phrase Book or the Langenscheidt Grundwortschatz Latein, 
which organize single-word expressions as well as phrasal lexical items under broad subject headings, can often provide preliminary 
evidence of conceptual metaphors. Alternatively, n-gram searches can be conducted for occurrences of target-domain vocabulary 
items. Careful examination of contextual usages will produce a tabulation of source-domain words used metaphorically of the target 
in question. Once initial metaphorical relations have been identified in this way, searches must be performed for occurrences of the 
whole range of vocabulary items belonging to each identified source domain with those of the target domain, in order to establish 
their degree of conventionalization in the language, as well as their internal mapping structure. (Synonym and antonym dictionaries 
like Ramshorn’s or any of the gradus ad Parnassum type are useful here). Metaphors recruiting a highly circumscribed set of 
source-domain words, or that are restricted to a particular author or time period, or that occur only in fixed phrases, will be of 
limited relevance in this respect. 
Given the overall set of source-to-target correspondences, generalizations can then be made about the conceptual mapping(s) 
underpinning the linguistic expressions (A search that yields expressions such as bellum exstinguere and cuncta bello ardent might 
lead us to posit a conceptual mapping of FIRE to WAR, for instance). In some (less interesting) cases, the mappings may involve 
only a single source-domain concept and target-domain concept; in others, it will involve whole systems of concepts. For the latter, 
it will be necessary to determine (possibly relying on statistical frequencies) which of the conceptual mappings is the more central 
(the metaphor’s “main meaning focus”: Kövecses 2003), and which are logical entailments of this central mapping based on Latin 
speakers’ conventional knowledge of the source domain. Of course, classification of linguistic expressions as manifestations of any 
given conceptual metaphor is not always straightforward. Sometimes, an expression may appear to reflect multiple mappings 
simultaneously. Though this may complicate the analyst’s neat categorization, it should hardly be surprising, since experience itself, 
which provides the grounding of and motivation for metaphors, is not easily segmentable. For an example, see n. 14. 
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the logic of the metaphor, the maximum of bravery. This is why the author of the Bellum Africanum 
can also describe Caesar as “carrying before himself a ‘tall spirit’” (animum enim altum . . . prae 
se ferebat, 10.3) to mean that he was brave, or why the author of the Latin Iliad can say that the 
Greeks and Trojans “‘set up straight’ their spirits” (instaurant . . . animos) to capture the idea that 
they fight with renewed courage: what is tall and straight is by nature “up” and thus metaphorically 
“courageous”.15 
Correspondingly, cowardice is construed as a condition of down(ward)ness of animus; that is, 
to behave like a coward is to have one’s animus oriented in some way “down”. Latin speakers 
therefore use words referring literally to “falling” (cadere) or “sending down” (demittere) in 
conjunction with animus to convey what we might express again in English as “losing” or “giving 
up” courage. For instance, to express that the Crustumini lost the conviction to go through with 
the war they had begun against the Romans, again Livy writes that their “spirits had ‘fallen’” 
(ceciderant animi, AUC. 1.11.3). Likewise, Caesar uses the construction animo deficere (literally, 
“to break down from courage”) to express the idea of losing courage in the face of some difficult 
circumstance, as in “Marcius Rufus . . . entreated his men not to give up courage” (ne animo 
deficient, BC. 2.43.1).16 Elsewhere, the image of animus as “thrown down” (perculsus) or simply 
                                                 
15 It is possible that figurative usages of excitare with animus in the sense of “embolden” (cf. Cic. Man. 6.4, quod maxime vestros 
animos excitare . . . debeat; Resp. 41.9, ad animos imperitorum excitandos . . . perfectus; Anon. Bell. Afr. 81.2, animos eorum 
excitabat; Sen. Contr. 10.2.17, non est utile rei publicae excitari hostium animos) can be accounted for in terms of this metaphor, 
as well – if we consider the literal meaning of the verb to be something like “build, erect, construct” (cf. Cic. Leg. 2.68, sepulcrum 
altius . . . excitari; Caes. BG. 5.40.2, turres; Suet. Claud. 1, tumulum; Sen. Ep. 52, aedificium; etc.). Alternatively, it may emerge 
from an ontological metaphor in which animus is construed in terms of a human or even animal agent (i.e., “move, stir, shake, set 
in motion (a person or animal)” > “set the spirit in motion” > “embolden”); this kind of “personification” of animus would certainly 
not have been unusual in Latin (cf., e.g., Sen. Phaed. 112, quo tendis, anime? quid furens saltus amas?; 163, animusque culpa 
plenus et semet timens, 255‒56, moderare, alumna, mentis effrenae impetus, / animos coerce). If the latter, it might be better to 
analyze this image as part of the ENERGETIC MOTION metaphor or even the VISUAL PROMINENCE metaphor of courage, as “causing 
to move out” (ex-citare) implies a change from a state of hiddenness to one of conspicuousness. But I am inclined to take excitare 
animum as reflecting a sort of structural metaphor because of expressions like Plaut. Trin. 132, exaedificaret suam incohatam 
ignaviam, where “emboldening” is clearly construed metaphorically as “building (up)” animus (as if something akin to oppidum, 
domum, templum, navem . . .). 
16 Cf. also Verg. Aen. 3.259–60, cecidere animi; Ov. Fast. 3.225, tela viris animique cadunt, Luc. Sat. fr. 27.9 = Non. 286M, re in 
secunda tollere animos, in mala demittere; Caes. BG. 7.29.1, ne se admodum animo demitterent; Sall. Jug. 98, demisso animo fuit; 
Caes. BC. 3.112.12, ne negotio desisteret neve animo deficeret. 
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“low” (humilis) or “lying flat” (iacens) is used to convey notions of cowardliness – as, for instance, 
when Cicero asks of the Gauls, “Do you think, judges, that with their military cloaks and breeches 
they are behaving at all like cowards”, literally, “with their courage sunk down and near-to-the-
ground?” (animo demisso atque humili, Font. 33), or when Propertius exhorts himself to turn from 
elegiac cowardliness to epic courage: surge, anime, ex humili; iam, carmina, sumite vires 
(2.10.11). 
In the images of the STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY metaphor, on the other hand, courage is construed 
as the wholeness and cowardice as the brokenness of animus. Thus, to give courage to a person is, 
literally, to “make fast” (firmare and its compounds) or “tie together” (colligere) or “harden” 
(indurare) or “make whole” (integrare) the animus. In Plautus’ Amphitruo, for example, Alcmena 
declares her resolve to endure her husband’s absence “with a strong and ‘bolted-on’ spirit” (animo 
forti atque offirmato, 656). When Caesar assures the Gauls that he will prevent further settlement 
of their territory by the Germans, this “‘made fast’ their spirits” (animos verbis confirmavit, BG. 
1.33.1). And Livy recounts that the Volsci and Aequi, under attack by the consul Valerius, “when 
they had ‘tied together’ their courage (animos collegissent) . . . rallied and held their own” (AUC. 
3.60.11).17 At the same time, to deprive someone of courage is to “break” (frangere, but also 
corrumpere or adflictare) the animus – as when once more Livy writes that Postumius, “after 
depriving (literally, ‘breaking’) the Aequi of their courage in skirmishing (cum leuibus proeliis 
Aequorum animos fregisset), forced an entrance into the town” (AUC. 4.49.9), or when Valerius 
Maximus tells us that “Hannibal beat down the strength of the Romans more than he ‘broke’ their 
courage” (magis vires Romanorum contudit quam animos fregit, Mem. 3.2.11).18 The same image 
                                                 
17 Cf. also Verg. Georg. 4.386, firmans animum sic incipit ipsa; Sall. Cat. 46.3, confirmato animo; Liv. AUC. 42.60.3, dum perculsi 
milites animos colligerent; Sen. EM. 104.22, hi iubebunt . . . animum indurare,; Hom. Lat. Il. 614–15, Apollo / integratque animum. 
18 Cf. Liv. AUC. 26.13.1, fregit animos; 32.31.2, animos fregisset; 38.16.14, infregit animos; Val. Flacc. Arg. 6.283–84, corripuit 
fregitque animos; Prop. Carm. 5.6.51, frangit et attollit vires in milite causa; Sall. Jug. 31, piget dicere . . . ut vobis animus . . . 
conruptus sit. 
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likely underwrites, as well, the meaning of the word murcus mentioned by Ammianus Marcellinus 
as soldiers’ jargon for a coward: Res Gestae 15.12.3, aliquando quisquam in Italia munus Martium 
pertimescens pollicem sibi praecidit, quos iocaliter murcos appellant, “Once in a while someone 
in Italy fearing military service cuts off his own thumb – and they call these men, derisively, 
murci”. If, as Edwin Fay has suggested (1905: 398), murcus can be derived from mulcare (“strike, 
maul, mutilate”), this word directly figures the coward as someone who is “mutilated”.19 
In the VISUAL PROMINENCE metaphor, courage and cowardice are expressed instead in 
metaphorical terms of the conspicuousness or hiddenness of animus.20 Hence expressions like 
magno animo esse (literally, “be with a big spirit”) or ingenti animo (“with a huge spirit”) or 
praestanti animo (“with a standing-forth spirit”) or excellenti animo (“with a towering spirit”) that 
signify courage.21 This metaphor probably also accounts for formulations in which courage is 
construed as the “increasing” or “growing” of animus: e.g., praesidio legionum addito nostris 
animus augetur (“The spirit ‘increases’ for our men from the additional support of the legions”, 
Caes. BG. 7.70.3) and veritus ne vanis tot conatibus suorum et hostibus cresceret animus (“He (sc. 
Scipio) feared the enemy’s spirits would ‘grow’ by his men’s so many futile attempts”, Liv. AUC. 
28.19.16).22 Conversely, the coward is typically portrayed as “hiding” or “lying concealed” by 
Latin authors: cf., e.g., quid ergo ille ignavissimus / mihi latitabat? (“Why is that utter coward 
hiding from me?” Plaut. Trin. 926–27) and utrum inclusum atque abditum latere in occulto atque 
                                                 
19 The etymology is not treated by De Vaan (2008), nor does murcus appear in this sense in the OLD, although a possible by-form 
murcidus attested by St. Augustine (Civ. 4.16) for the comedies of Pomponius is given with the meaning “lazy, inactive”. 
20 Perhaps no principled distinction can actually be made between the mappings of the VISUAL PROMINENCE and VERTICAL 
ORIENTATION metaphors, since in human experience what is up is typically easier to see and what is down is typically more difficult 
to see. Here, however, I treat the two metaphors as discrete, to better highlight the systematicity of each mapping. 
21 Cf. Cic. Deiot. 36, magno animo et erecto est; Caes. BG. 7.10, hostium impetum magno animo sustineant; Sall. Ep. ad Caes. 
7.10, ingentem eorum animum subegit; Cic. Phil. 14.36, fortissimo praestantissimoque animo exercitum castris eduxerit; Caes. BC. 
3.4.4, Rhascypolis praeerat, excellenti virtute. 
22 Crescere animum, “embolden” may again suggest a metaphorical view of animus as a kind of human, animal, or even vegetal 
entity: see above, n. 12. 
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ignaviam suam tenebrarum ac parietum custodiis tegere? (“Was he to lurk about in the dark, shut 
in and hidden, concealing his own cowardice with the safeguards of shadows and walls?” Cic. 
Rab. 21). The archaic word cussiliris given by Festus as a synonym for ignavus also appears to 
metaphorize the coward directly as “covering up” or “hiding”.23 Though several etymologies have 
been proposed, the most plausible derivation is from cossim in lira, literally, “cowering (on the 
thighs) in a furrow”, its figurative sense of “coward” thus apparently developing by reference to 
the threat avoidance behaviors characteristic of some animals.24 
Finally, in the images of the ENERGETIC MOTION metaphor, courage corresponds to liveliness 
(of animus) and cowardice to lethargy. This can be seen in formulations like animus alacer or 
strenuus, literally a “quick” or “lively spirit”, as in, for instance, tuumque simul promptum animum 
et alacrem perspexi ad defendendam rem publicam (“I perceived at the same time your ‘ready and 
quick spirit’ for defending the Republic”, Cic. Fam. 3.11.4) or postquam omnium animos alacris 
videt, cohortatus, ut petitionem suam curae haberent, conventum dimisit (“When he (sc. Catiline) 
sees their ‘quick spirits’, he charged them to attend to his interest at the election of consuls and 
dismissed the assembly”, Sall. Cat. 21.5), and, likewise, in quod si animo strenuo fecissent, 
futurum ut aduersarii non possent resistere (“If they had done it ‘with a quick spirit’, their foes 
would have been unable to resist”, Nep. Dat. 6.4).25 The converse construal of cowardice as 
lethargy is well known from uses of ignavus, meaning, etymologically, “not active” (in-gnavus): 
e.g., ‘conpertum ego habeo, milites . . . neque ex ignavo strenuum neque fortem ex timido exercitum 
                                                 
23 I.e., Paul. Fest. p. 50, 13 Müller, cussilirem pro ignavo dicebant antiqui. 
24 Walde-Hofmann (1954) I, 162. Cf. Rheden (1907) 699, “die Bezeichnung ist sehr anschaulich, offenbar hergenommen von 
Vögeln und anderen Tieren, die sich, um such der Beobachtung und Bedrohung zu entziehen, in eine Furche ducken”. 
25 Cf. Col. RR. 11.1.17, cum uigore et alacritate animi praecedentem eum tamquam ducem strenue sequatur; Caes. BG. 1.46.4, 
multo maior alacritas studiumque pugnandi maius exercitui iniectum est; Sen. Cons. Helv. 12.8.5, alacres itaque et erecti 
quocumque res tulerit intrepido gradu properemus; Val. Max. Mem. 3.2.3, alacri animo suos ad id proelium . . . cohortatus est; 
Caes. BC. 3.92.4, est quaedam animi incitatio atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, quae studio pugnae incenditur; Tac. Hist. 
2.14, strenui ignavique in victoria idem audent. 
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oratione imperatoris fieri’ (“‘I am well aware, soldiers . . . that a brave army cannot be made of a 
cowardly one, nor a strong one from a weak one, simply by a speech of its commander’”, Sall. 
Cat. 58.2).26 But the metaphor extends to uses of segnis and iners as well: cf., e.g., nec Turnum 
segnis retinet mora (“Nor does any cowardly delay hold Turnus back”, Verg. Aen. 10.308) and tam 
sis hostis iners, quam malus hospes eras (“Be as cowardly an enemy as you were evil a guest!” 
Ov. Ep. 13.44). 
As may be seen from these (and numerous other) examples, certain conventional, everyday 
ways of expressing the concepts of courage and cowardice in Latin are conveyed by metaphors 
drawing on images of concrete human bodily and physical experience. In these metaphors, images 
of bodily experience are predicated of animus in a regular and consistent fashion as a means of 
expressing the fact of someone’s “having” courage or not. The metaphors are regular in the sense 
that they organize the figurative meanings of whole semantic fields. Each metaphor, that is, 
operates at a level of sense making that is supralexical, rather than belonging to the semantic 
structure of any individual word (e.g., the LIVELINESS metaphor structures the meanings not only 
of ignavus but of the range of terms designating laziness). They are consistent in the sense that 
they recruit pairs of contrastively related image schemas toward the expression both of courage 
and of cowardice, each metaphor thereby projecting the relational structure of the literal domain 
onto the figurative domain. Let me emphasize, then, that from the perspective of the cognitive 
linguistic theory of metaphor, it is these metaphors per se that make sense of Latin speakers’ talk 
of courage and cowardice and in fact constitute their conceptualization of these categories vis-à-
                                                 
26 Cf. also Cic. Inv. 1.92, indignum esse ab homine ignavissimo virum fortissimum Aiacem necatum; Liv. AUC. 2.46.5, ‘adeo 
ignauissimos hostes magis timetis quam Iouem Martemque per quos iurastis?’ and 5.28.8, Postumius suis in tutum receptis cum 
contione aduocata terrorem increparet ac fugam, fusos esse ab ignauissimo ac fugacissimo hoste. 
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vis animus. Without these metaphors, Latin speakers would have an understanding of these 
categories that was very impoverished indeed. 
 
3. Alternative metaphors. 
This is not to imply that Latin speakers did not also possess other (and other metaphorical) ways 
of conceptualizing courage, of course. Evidence indicates that a much wider set of images 
actually converged on this conceptualization. For instance, courage may be conceived as a sort 
of substance that “fills” the body, as when Turnus “‘fills’ the Rutulians with daring courage” (Rutulos 
animis audacibus implet, Verg. Aen. 7.475). Or courage may be imagined as a kind of physical 
object “given” to someone (by the hands), as when again Turnus taunts the Trojans as “the sort 
of soldiers to whom trust in an intervening moat and the delays of trenches . . . ‘give’ courage” 
(quibus haec medii fiducia valli / fossarumque morae . . . / dant animos, Verg. Aen. 9.142‒44) or 
Athena literally “‘hands over’ courage to the young man” (animos iuveni . . . ministrat, Hom. Lat. 
Il. 396).27 Courage may also be conceived in metaphorical terms of spatial proximity: Cicero, for 
example, reporting that his arrival in Cilicia emboldened Cassius, writes that courage literally 
“came near to” Cassius (Cassio . . . animus accessit, Att. 5.20.3). In another frequent metaphor, 
courage is a kind of fire. Giving courage is therefore setting animus aflame (inflammare or 
accendere or incendere animum), as when Allecto promises to, literally, “‘set their spirits on fire’ 
by lust for senseless war” (accendamque animos insani Martis amorem, Verg. Aen. 7.550).28 
Courage is also sharpness: for instance, Livy recounts that after the capture of New Carthage, 
Scipio instituted a new training regimen for his soldiers and thus “‘sharpened’ their bodies and 
                                                 
27 However, Valpy 1828, 263 derives ministro from minus by analogy with magister < magis, the vocalization of the first syllable 
paralleling comminus and eminus. 
28 Cf. Verg. Aen. 12.426, primusque animos accendit in hostem; Cic. Man. 6, vestros animos . . . inflammare . . . debeat; Liv. AUC. 
2.46.7, accendamus militum animos; 3.61.8, accendit animos; 6.14.10, accendunt militum animos; 26.44.8, ad accendendos militum 
animos; etc. 
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spirits for war” (corpora simul animosque ad bellum acuebant, AUC. 25.51.7).29 The overall set of 
metaphors delivering Latin’s concept of courage can thus be represented as in Figure 2. <Figure 
2: Overall set of metaphors delivering Latin speakers’ concept of courage in terms of animus.> 
Nevertheless, I believe the VERTICAL ORIENTATION, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY, VISUAL 
PROMINENCE, and ENERGETIC MOTION metaphors can be distinguished from these others in several 
important respects. To begin with, they are regular and consistent in a way the others are not: that 
is, as already noted, they structure meaning pervasively across Latin’s semantic system, over 
periods of the language and at different levels of the linguistic code, whereas the others tend to be 
(usually generically) more restricted. And they recruit images always in pairwise fashion toward 
the conceptualization of both courage and cowardice, whereas the other metaphors are univocal, 
tending to focus on the metaphorical characterization of courage alone. For example, while a 
“sharp” animus signifies courage, images of “dullness” typically denote stupidity in Latin (Bettini 
2011, 50‒51). And while “giving” animus to a person or for animus to “come near to” a person 
means being emboldened, the “removal” or “departure” of animus signifies instead loss of 
consciousness or even death. 
Perhaps most importantly, the VERTICAL ORIENTATION, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY, VISUAL 
PROMINENCE, and ENERGETIC MOTION metaphors can be distinguished in terms of their grounding 
in a single, coherent domain of embodied experience. It is hard to imagine a single, regularly 
occurring situation of human embodiment that includes all the dimensions necessary to 
simultaneously motivate a conceptualization of courage as sharpening, burning, giving, filling, and 
approaching. Each of these metaphors therefore seems to be independently motivated, and their 
                                                 
29 Almost exactly the same expression occurs at AUC. 35.35.9, non sineret sub tectis marcescere otio sed educeret et in armis 
decurrere cogeret, simul animos acueret et corpora exerceret. SHARPNESS of animus may also signify anger, as apparently in Verg. 
Aen. 1.57, mollitque animos et temperat iras. 
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grounding is probably to be sought not in relation to courage specifically, but in relation to the 
more general psychological and emotional category whose understanding they appear to deliver.30 
By contrast, the VERTICAL ORIENTATION, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY, VISUAL PROMINENCE and 
ENERGETIC MOTION metaphors have clear grounding and motivation as a system in embodied 
experiences of what Walter Cannon termed the “fight-or-flight response”. It is easy enough to see 
how the specific imagistic content of the metaphors is motivated by the set of autonomic 
physiological reactions and stereotyped bodily behaviors associated with these scenarios.31 The 
images of the ENERGETIC MOTION metaphor, for instance, appear to be grounded in felt sensations 
related to the release of adrenal catecholemines (especially epinephrine and norepinephrine), 
which prepare the body for quick action by accelerating the heart rate, increasing blood pressure 
and muscle tensity, and providing additional glucose to the bloodstream as a boost of available 
energy for rigorous exertion.32 Because this mechanism actually becomes mobilized in scenarios 
where an individual has determined that “fight” is the more adaptive course of action – in other 
words, in “courage” scenarios – liveliness thus affords a ready metaphorical image for 
understanding this category. On the other hand, the lethargy image is likely motivated by the fact 
that in “flight” conditions, digestive functioning, muscle contraction, heart rate, and breathing are 
slowed to preserve metabolic resources, proprioceptively and perhaps objectively perceived as a 
kind of physical sluggishness taken to be characteristic of – and so a salient metaphorical image 
                                                 
30 The BURNING, FILLING, and SHARPENING metaphors each characterize a whole range of emotion concepts. One immediately thinks 
of Latin elegists’ use of “burning” as a metaphor especially for erotic love. It is equally common, though, to find hope and joy – as 
well as grief and anger – construed metaphorically as fire. And even as “filling” the animus means giving courage, it is also possible 
to “fill” someone or someone’s animus with other emotion-substances: with love (as, for instance, in Naev. fr. 136, animum amore 
capitali compleuerint) or with superstition (as in Liv. AUC. 29.14.2, impleuerat ea res superstitionum animos), or hope, or 
happiness, or longing. “Sharpening” metaphorically captures emotional arousal in general, which is why acer and acutus often 
have the sense of “impassioned”. The PROXIMITY metaphor has perhaps the widest scope: “coming near to” or “approaching” can 
express the occurrence of all sorts of mental states, above all “agreement” (as in expressions like ipse quoque huic sententiae 
accedo, Iust. Dig. 36.2.12.6). 
31 The classic treatment is Cannon (1953). See now esp. LeDoux (1996); Panksepp (1998); Porges (2011); and Everly and Lating 
2012. 
32 For details, see Usdin et al. (1976) and Makara et al. (1983). 
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for – cowardice. The image may also be grounded in the tendency of human beings to resort to 
“tonic immobility” or “freezing” in situations of extreme danger, where “fight” is not favorable 
and escape by feigning death represents the better option. 
At the same time, UP(RIGHT)NESS and CONSPICUOUSNESS are apt images for courage because 
the “fight” scenario entails an increase in apparent height, size, and stability, due to protrusion of 
the chest and raising of the head and neck brought about by involuntary contraction of the back 
muscles, along with bracing of the legs. Pupil dilation and horripilation, while enhancing vision 
and environmental sensitivity, also tend to give an impression of increased size. Images of 
cowardice as down(ward)ness and hiddenness are instead likely grounded in the typical “flight” 
behaviors of lying prone on the ground (collapse) and concealment, not to mention the body’s 
attempt to appear smaller (and so less threatening to a predator) by contracting the muscles of the 
front of the body, pulling the shoulders, head, and spine inward and down. The STRUCTURAL 
INTEGRITY metaphor may also depend on effects of the release of epinephrine and norepinephrine 
during “fight” or “flight”. These neurotransmitters are known to be related to so-called “phantom 
limb” perception: their availability to the nervous system has in fact been shown to correlate 
positively with the onset and maintenance of phantom sensations.33 One of their effects, in other 
words, appears to be to induce a perception of the body as an integrated whole (even in cases where 
the body is not physically whole). If “fight” involves sustained release of these chemicals, this 
would account for the WHOLENESS image of courage, whereas their diminishment from the 
bloodstream and nerve fibers in the “flight” scenario could produce a (consciously or 
                                                 
33 Cf.  Allen (1990); and esp. Sherman et al. (1989). 
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unconsciously) perceived disruption of the “body schema” coming to be interpreted of cowardice 
in metaphorical terms of brokenness.34 
 
4. Concluding remarks. 
I have dwelt on the metaphorical structuring of Latin’s conceptualization of courage and cowardice 
via embodied image schemas, and on the likely experiential grounding of these conceptual 
metaphors, to be able to suggest what I believe an experientialist account of meaning can bring to 
classical studies. In positing that sense-making emerges from embodied experience, such an 
approach offers, minimally, a model of linguistic meaning capable of explaining lexical polysemy 
in a systematic fashion. More than this, though, it offers a model of cultural meaning. In treating 
figurative associations pervasive and highly conventionalized in the linguistic system as reflecting 
conceptual (not only semantic) structures, such an approach can help identify the sorts of meanings 
that Latin speakers will tend to rely on in constructing and in interpreting “texts” of all kinds – 
including those inscribed through the aesthetic codes of visual representation – and that thus link 
together Roman society’s various imaginative activities into a cohesive signifying order. As one 
immediate example, consider Trajan’s Column. Though it is probably impossible to reduce the 
meaning of the column and its relief to a single overarching message, Per Gustaf Hamberg’s claim 
(1945, 116‒19) that it is meant above all to advertise the emperor’s “manly courage” (virtus) seems 
undeniable. In this light, the placement of Trajan’s statue at its top seems motivated by the 
metaphorical understanding of what is courageous as being “up”. In effect, the column itself, with 
what Salvatore Settis called (1988) the constant vertical directional “impulse” of its decoration, 
                                                 
34 The same effect could be attributed to the release of cortisol by the parasympathetic nervous system, following “fight-or-flight”. 
High levels of cortisol are known to severally disrupt hippocampal functioning, and the hippocampus has often been seen as a 
crucial brain area in the maintenance of the body schema. See MacLachlan (2004). 
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literalizes in its physical form the metaphor of courage as up(right)ness. In this sense, the metaphor 
provides a principle of topographical organization for the construction and decoration of the 
column, as well as the mechanism of its interpretation. 
More broadly, such an approach provides the sort of “experience-near” perspective that has 
recently been advocated in the study of ancient cultures. An “experience-near” perspective, as we 
know, privileges “native” ways of knowing and of representing the world, rather than concepts 
belonging to the observer’s own cultural framework (concepts that Geertz 1973, 481‒82 calls 
“experience-distant”). By illustrating how human-universal structures and processes of 
conceptualization give rise to the idiosyncratic meanings subtending a particular society’s 
symbolic activities, image schema theory provides exactly the sort of language-independent, “etic” 
framework of analysis that can enable an “emic” accounting of Latin speakers’ conceptual system. 
Especially when combined with a culturally-comparative perspective – since this helps highlight 
how speakers of different languages may elaborate different metaphorical models on the basis of 
the same images schemas, or how different languages and cultures capture the “same” concept 
through sometimes very different metaphorical images. Indeed, comparing Latin’s metaphors of 
courage and cowardice with those from other languages reveals that cultural understandings of 
these categories are highly variable. In Greek, for example, courage may be conceived as a sort of 
smoke or vapor in the body (θυμός being connected with Latin fumus already by Onians 1954, 44‒
58).35 Greek speakers also appear to favor animal imagery, especially of the lion, wild boar, wolf, 
or leopard for courage and of the deer or cattle for cowardice.36 Many modern European languages 
                                                 
35 Cf., e.g., Hom. Od. 10.461, θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι λάβητε; Il. 6.256, 7.152, θυμὸς ἀνῆκεν; Od. 2.315, ἀέξεται ἔνδοθι θυμός. See now 
Caswell (1990) 6‒8. 
36 See esp. Schnapp-Gourbeillon (1981) and Lonsdale (1990). The HIDDENNESS metaphor of cowardice in Latin – where the coward 
is directly likened to the cowering animal – suggests these images are not entirely foreign to Roman culture, either. 
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conceptualize courage and cowardice instead through “heart” images, often in conjunction with an 
OBJECT metaphor: cf., e.g., Italian prendere and perdere corraggio, French prendre and perdre 
courage, and German den Mut finden and verlieren.37 In Mandarin Chinese, courage is imagined 
in relation to the gallbladder, however: “gall-capacity (dan-liang)” means “courage” and the brave 
person is said to have a “big gall (dan-da)”, whereas a coward has a “small gall (dan-xiao)”.38 
Thus, while Latin speakers’ metaphors may be based on experiences shared by presumably all 
human beings, their privileging of such experiences in metaphorical conceptualization appears to 
constitute a distinctive feature of their signifying order.39 
In providing an “experience-near” perspective, such an experientialist approach thus addresses 
a significant deficit of classical studies: namely, that while the ostensible objective of most research 
is to reconstruct the meaning(s) of some cultural artefact in a way that conforms as much as 
possible to historical context, scholars nevertheless tend to analyze the repertory of Roman 
culture’s meanings in terms of categories that belong to their own intellectual and cultural 
framework. The danger, of course, is not beginning our reflections from such “etic” categories – 
this is inevitable and in fact necessary – but remaining exclusively within them, viewing them as 
natural categories that are true in an ahistorical sense and never even minimally questioning 
whether or how Latin speakers elaborated similar conceptualizations. At the same time, it is 
obviously undesirable to aim exclusively at the “emic”, since this poses the risk of losing any sense 
of how any particular symbolic configuration is distinctive and meaningful within a larger cultural 
or linguistic context. As Clifford Geertz wrote (1983, 58), “The trick is not to get yourself into 
                                                 
37 Gutiérrez Pérez (2008). 
38 Yu (2003). 
39 What accounts for Latin speakers’ privileged conceptualization of courage and cowardice in such markedly embodied terms is, 
I would suggest, the particular symbolic affordances that the human body seems to have presented to them for representing and 
understanding psychological and emotional phenomena of all sorts. I have shown elsewhere the Latin speakers’ understanding of 
most aspects of mental activity: Short (2012) and (2013). 
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some inner correspondence of spirit with your informants”, the result of which would be something 
like the proverbial “ethnography of witchcraft written by a witch”. The trick is instead to involve 
the etic and the emic in a productive dialectic that highlights where conceptualizations diverge and 
so avoids predetermining the meaning of cultural forms by subsuming them to presumably 
analogous conceptual categories.40 
To be clear. In advocating that Classical Studies incorporate cognitively-informed 
methodologies, I am not suggesting that scholars need to suddenly start talking about post-synaptic 
depolarization, dendrodendritic inhibition, and backpropagating action potentials. There is the 
danger of losing sight in the neuroscientific weeds of how human beings (and not just cognitive 
systems) go about making sense of their world. Nor am I implying we should view the classical 
languages as simply a resource for supporting the universalizing claims of some cognitive 
linguists. In showing that Latin speakers’ meanings depend to some extent on cognitive structures 
and processes shared by all humans, there is the danger of downplaying their sociocultural 
situatedness. What I am suggesting we need is an approach that does not hesitate to describe Latin 
speakers’ mental contents in scientifically validated ways and in terms of recognized brain-based 
mechanisms of meaning construction, but that does so at a level of abstraction functional to 
characterizing what is different about those “contents”41 – while recognizing, at the same time, 
that human embodiment can and does impose certain constraints on the proliferation of meaning 
cross-culturally. This is because the image schemas and image-schematic scenarios that underpin 
even highly abstract, culturally situated concepts – along with the construal operations of which 
image schemas are susceptible – are specified by the nature of the human body and by our bodily 
interactions with the natural and social environment. Opportunities for metaphorical projection are 
                                                 
40 Cf. Bettini (2009). 
41 Cf. Detienne (2002) and (2005), and Bettini (2009). 
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also subject to limitation, since mappings of image-schematic structure must preserve the cognitive 
topology of the concrete source domain in the metaphorical target domain and thus possible 
figurative relations are constrained by the internal structuring of concepts.42 Probably even the 
most imaginative metaphorical images of literary production can be shown to derive from 
conventionalized patterns of figurative associations (by way of the elaboration, extension, 
combination or questioning of established mappings: cf. Kövecses 2005). Indeed, to be meaningful 
in the first place, what is imaginative and creative must relate at a certain order to that which is 
conventionalized and ordinary.43 
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